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Stern: Judicial Error That Is Subject to Discipline in New York

JUDICIAL ERROR THAT IS SUBJECT TO
DISCIPLINE IN NEW YORK
GeraldStern*

INTRODUCTION

The strength of the judicial system is based on the independence of
individual judges to render decisions on the merits, subject to appellate
review. Judges' mistakes and abuses of discretion generally may be
corrected within the judicial system, not by a disciplinary system. That is
how it should be, notwithstanding that errors of law place a considerable
burden and expense on the parties to seek justice in other courts.
Although mistakes often are not rectified because appeals are too
expensive to pursue for many wronged litigants, judges must be given
wide latitude in making decisions within a broad range of discretion
without being subjected to disciplinary procedures. Good faith mistakes
as a general rule should not-some would argue should never-be the
basis for discipline
Judicial conduct commissions, which dismiss the great majority of
complaints received, often have to explain to dissatisfied litigants why
the commissions cannot discipline judges for being mistaken in the
application or interpretation of law. Many complainants seek from
commissions only what the courts can provide: new hearings and
another judge to hear their cases.
Yet, under certain circumstances, the law authorizes investigations
into judicial decision-making. Although improper influence, bias, and
corruption have always been recognized as grounds to remove a judge
from office, they are not the sole grounds for discipline. When a judge's
acts are so obviously contrary to law, it might not matter why the judge
acted as he or she did. Within the broad spectrum of judicial error, it is
easy to identify many situations that either are or are not subject to
*
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discipline. Finding the point within that spectrum at which judicial error
becomes misconduct can be challenging.
This article will explore judicial disciplinary determinations of the
New York Commission on Judicial Conduct and decisions of the New
York Court of Appeals that have reviewed Commission determinations
that judges' "errors" constituted misconduct. The focus will be to
consider whether standards can be identified distinguishing between
judicial error that is subject to discipline and judicial error that can only
be reviewed and corrected in the courts.
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AS A RELATIVELY
NEW PHENOMENON IN NEW YORK
Before the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct began
operating in 1975, relatively few judges were disciplined. From the latter
part of the 19th century to 1975, sixteen judges were removed from
office, seven were publicly censured, and fourteen were mildly rebuked
in decisions that either dismissed misconduct charges or otherwise
terminated disciplinary proceedings.'
The formation of the Commission on Judicial Conduct changed the
dynamics of the judicial disciplinary process, and it was obvious that the
new procedures would generate many more complaints, investigations,
and disciplinary sanctions. Of particular relevance to the discussion of
whether judicial error could be subject to discipline, more complaints
would be made and considered, and judges' alleged "errors" would be
more closely scrutinized. Since there has been a lot more attention paid
to judicial ethics since 1975 than ever before, it stands to reason that
some inroads would be made into the almost-total protection from
discipline that had been given to New York judges who committed
egregious errors of law.
Although lawyers representing judges in judicial disciplinary
proceedings have argued, and continue to argue, that judicial decisions
that are not derived from improper influence, bias, or corruption should
not lead to discipline, that view is not supported by recent case law. In
the past two decades, the New York Court of Appeals has disciplined
judges for the violation of fundamental (i.e., well-recognized) rights. In
many of these cases, there were no indications that the judges knew that

1. See Gerald Stem, Is Judicial Discipline in New York State a Threat to Judicial
Independence? 7 PACE L. REV. 291 (1987).
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their conduct was contrary to law, which suggests that "good faith" is
not always a defense.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW ON
DISCIPLINING JUDGES FOR LEGAL ERROR

At the turn of the twentieth century, the Appellate Division, First
and Second Judicial Departments, respectively, commenting on
accusations that magistrates had been unduly lenient in dismissing
gambling cases, held that legal error, even a series of legal errors, would
not justify a judge's removal from office. The First Department court
held that in the absence of proof of corruption or incompetence, no
action would be taken. 2 The Second Department court held that there
had been no proof that the judge's conduct "was prompted by fraud,
corruption, a deliberative intent to violate the law, or a conscious and
corrupt bias."3 A few years later, the Appellate Division, First Judicial
Department relaxed the standard for a judge's removal only slightly:
When the conduct was based on "unworthy or illegal motives" or the
result of "ignorance ... a perverted character, or... a lack of judicial

qualities," the judge should be removed.4
Generally, the courts did not consider the deprivation of basic rights
to be a basis for removal from office. 5 In a 1931 case, a judge was
charged with a "callous disregard of the rights of defendants. ' 6 Despite
evidence that supported the charge, the Appellate Division, First Judicial
Department dismissed that charge but removed the judge, Jean Norris,
who had the distinction of being the first woman judge in the New York
City courts. Greatly exacerbating the judge's misconduct in court was
the judge's flamboyant conduct out of court. It seems clear that the
appellate court was more upset with Judge Norris' extolling the virtues
2.
3.
4.
1909).
5.

See In re Baker, 87 N.Y.S. 1022 (App. Div. 1904).
In re Tighe, 89 N.Y.S. 719, 721 (App. Div. 1904).
In re Droege, 114 N.Y.S. 375, 386-87 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 90 N.E. 340 (N.Y.
See Stem, supranote 1, at 322-26.

6. FINAL REPORT OF SAMUEL SEABURY, REFEREE, IN THE MATrER OF THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE MAGISTRATES' COURTS IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT AND THE MAGISTRATES

THEREOF, AND OF ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW PRACTICING IN SAID COURTS (March 29, 1932), in 3 NEW
YORK CITY POLICE CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION COMMISSIONS, 1894-1994, app. 245 (Gabriel J.
Chin ed. 1997).
7. In re Norris, 252 N.Y.S. 1023 (App. Div. 1931) (mem.). Herbert Mitgang reported that
Judge Norris, who violated the rights of men and women, had pledged to treat women with
"kindness" and with "gloves of velvet rather than fingers of steel." HERBERT MITGANG, THE MAN
WHO RODE THE TIGER, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE SAMUEL SEABURY 192 (1963).
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of Fleischmann's Yeast to her digestive system, in ads that ran in
numerous national magazines, than with her harsh treatment of
defendants. Or, more likely, it was concerned with her harshness toward
defendants but did not want to create a precedent for disciplining harsh
judges.
There are no other reported cases before the establishment of the
Commission on Judicial Conduct of judges being removed from office
for violating the rights of defendants. Even as late8 as 1968, the courts
were reluctant to discipline judges for such conduct.
In the 1976 decision of In re Perry,9 the Appellate Division, Second
Judicial Department considered the case of a Suffolk County District
Court Judge who had directed two police officers to bring a coffee
vendor into court in handcuffs because the judge did not like the taste of
coffee he 'was drinking during a court break. The coffee vendor had no
expectation of appearing in court that evening. He testified that he was
marched from his coffee truck outside the courthouse, through the halls
of the courthouse, and into the courtroom in handcuffs.
The Perry case was one of the first brought by the New York
Commission on Judicial Conduct, which had been established one year
earlier. The Appellate Division, while finding the judge's conduct
distasteful, made it clear that the decision to remove him was based on
his false testimony during the investigation by the new Commission on
Judicial Conduct. 10 As shocking as the judge's underlying conduct was,
if he had not testified falsely, he apparently would not have been
removed from office.
In 1982, the Commission removed a town justice for a pattern of
abusing defendants' rights, including incarcerating defendants for
periods beyond what the law authorized, finding defendants guilty
because he disliked their lawyer, and denying defendants the right to
counsel. " The judge did not seek review in the Court of Appeals.
8. In 1968, the Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department in considering the record of
a disciplinary proceeding on a petition for the removal of a Suffolk County District Court Judge,

found an insufficient basis for such action, and made only a passing reference to a procedure that
the Appellate Division implicitly criticized. The Court stated: "[l]n cases involving traffic violations
and other minor infractions, defendants should not be handcuffed and placed in detention cells
either during a recess of the trial or while waiting for complaints to be drawn." In re Schmidt, 296
N.Y.S.2d 49, 51 (App. Div. 1968) (per curiam).
9. 385 N.Y.S.2d 589 (App. Div. 1976).

10. See id. at 590. At the time, the Appellate Divisions had authority to discipline lower court
judges on charges brought by the Commission.
11.

See In re Ellis, N.Y. COMM'N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT ANNUAL REPORT 107 (1983)

[hereinafter N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP.]. For a similar case and a similar result, see In re Jutkofsky,
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In 1983, the Court of Appeals considered the first of the
Commission's cases of judges who acted as judicial tyrants. The Court
of Appeals removed J. Richard Sardino, a full-time, Syracuse City Court
Judge who had "consistently failed (in 62 cases) to inform the accused of
the right to counsel and failed to conduct even a minimal inquiry to
determine whether they were entitled to assigned counsel,"' 2 abused his
authority in setting bail, failed to set bail in some misdemeanor cases,
expressed disbelief at arraignment as to defendants' claims after
questioning the defendants at arraignment about the charges, and,
generally, was derisive towards unrepresented defendants.' 3 The Court
of Appeals upheld the Commission's determination that the14 judge's
conduct showed "a shocking disregard for due process of law.'
In that same year, the Court of Appeals removed from office Paul
McGee, a part-time town justice, for coercing guilty pleas, conducting
improper ex parte conferences with police officers, failing to advise
defendants in criminal proceedings of their rights at arraignment,
eliciting incriminating statements from defendants in criminal cases, and
finding defendants guilty without a trial or a formal guilty plea.' 5 The
Commission had charged eight cases and established that Judge
McGee's conduct in those cases was typical of how he handled cases in
his court. It was clear that Judge McGee did not intentionally disregard
defendants' rights; he just assumed he could talk to defendants at
arraignment, and if, in the course of those discussions, the defendants
informally acknowledged
their guilt, they were guilty and there was no
6
need for trials.'

One year later, in In re Reeves, the Court of Appeals removed a
family court judge from office who had failed to properly advise
litigants in family court of their rights, failed to require litigants to
submit sworn financial disclosure statements as required by law, and
N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 111 (1986). Judge Jutkofsky did not seek review of the Commission's
determination that he be removed from office.
12. In re Sardino, 448 N.E.2d 83, 84 (N.Y. 1983) (per curiam).
13.

See id.

14. Id. at 85 (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. In re McGee, 452 N.E.2d 1258, 1259 (N.Y. 1983) (mem.).
16. Even after the investigation, the filing of charges, and during the formal hearing, the judge
had no clue what he had done wrong. At one point, the judge testified that, since the defendant had
the stolen goods, she was guilty: "If she had the cigarettes with her, she certainly would have been
guilty, wouldn't she? . . . She had the goods on her. She had to be guilty. Am I right or wrong?"
McGee, 452 N.E.2d at 1258. There was no doubt that this well-intentioned judge simply had no
concept of the judicial role he was obliged to fulfill. This is a classic case of a "good faith" error that
had serious consequences.
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took jurisdiction of cases notwithstanding that he had no legal basis to
do so. 17 In removing the judge from office, the Court of Appeals rejected
the conclusions of a distinguished referee, a former Presiding Justice of
the Appellate Division, Third Judicial Department, who had been
assigned by the Commission on Judicial Conduct to preside over the
hearing. The referee had concluded that Judge Reeves' mistakes
constituted technical violations of the law because he had acted in good
faith and simply misapprehended the legal issues in the cases before
him.18
The Court of Appeals, citing its Sardino decision for the principle
that a "repeated pattern of failing to advise litigants of their
constitutional rights ...
is serious misconduct," held that Judge Reeves'
actions as a judge warranted removal and could not be excused on the
basis that they were errors of law, although, as the Court said, "these
were errors of law." 19
So, in the course of two years, 1983 and 1984, the New York Court
of Appeals in Sardino, McGee, and Reeves made it crystal clear that a
judge's repeated errors of established law, if serious enough, could
warrant removal from office. In the intervening years, the court has not
wavered from the decisions in these three cases, but judges continue to
defend misconduct charges by arguing that because their conduct
constitutes "judicial error" at worst, the proper place to challenge a
judge's rulings or decisions is in the appellate courts. McGee and Reeves
laid the "good faith" defense to rest. Judge Sardino's caustic, pro-police
comments eliminated any defense that he had acted in good faith. He
was so outspoken during arraignments in court that his words provided
proof of his mens rea or intent to be punitive. From a disciplinary
counsel's point of view, the easiest cases to establish are those in which
the judge acts and speaks harshly.
In 1991, the Court of Appeals removed a family court judge 20 for
his language conveying the impression that he was biased, and for
failing
to inform litigants appearing before him of their constitutional
and statutory rights, including their right to counsel . . .and
instead exerted undue pressure on these parties to make damning

17.
18.
19.
20.

469 N.E.2d 1321, 1321-22 (N.Y. 1984) (per curiam).
See id.
at1322.
Id.at 1323.
In re Esworthy, 568 N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (N.Y. 1991).
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admissions, sometimes by threatening incarceration or other
consequences which he had no authority to impose.'
The court held that the family court judge's misconduct constituted
an abuse of power that "'has
irredeemably damaged public confidence in
22
the integrity of his court.'
The New York Court of Appeals has consistently shown that it has
no hesitation to treat, as serious misconduct, flagrant errors of
fundamental due process violations. But it has been critical of the
Commission for finding violations that have not been established either
by statute or case law, and has been reluctant to permit the Commission
to discipline judges for lengthy, inexcusable delays that suggest neglect
of duties.
In 1988, the Court of Appeals "accepted" a Commission
determination that an attorney village justice be removed from office for
"a persistent and pervasive pattern of neglect of his judicial and
administrative duties. 2 3 But the court criticized the Commission for
including, in its determination, references to the judge's failure to deal
with cases on his calendar for more than two years. Those Commission
findings, said the court, "betray an intrusion into matters of internal
court administration and substantive 24law that may well exceed the
Commission's ambit of responsibility.
Two years later, the Court of Appeals, in a 4-2 decision, dismissed
all charges against a Supreme Court Justice who had failed to decide
eight motions for up to nine years. Several lawyers over the years had
commenced civil proceedings before other judges in the judge's court to
compel him to render decisions, and numerous other attorneys had
complained about the judge's delays to his administrative judge. Despite
a clear provision in the rules governing judicial conduct that requires a
judge to dispose promptly of the business of the court, the court held that
the failure to promptly dispose of pending matters does not give the
Commission authority to act without other indications of misconduct or
a demonstrated
inability of an administrative judge to resolve the
25
problem.

21.
22.
23.
omitted).
24.
25.

Id. at 1196 (citations omitted).
Id.
In re Lenney, 522 N.E.2d 38, 39 (N.Y. 1988) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
Id. at 39.
Id.
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In 1992, the Court of Appeals considered the case of a lawyer, citycourt judge who held unrepresented defendants in jail without bail in
misdemeanor cases although he knew that he was obligated by law to set
bail. The Commission had sustained numerous charges that the judge
violated various sections of the Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL"). The
judge had acknowledged that he knowingly committed judicial error.
Nevertheless, the court, in a 4-3 decision with Judges Kaye, Simons, and
Alexander dissenting and voting for removal, rejected the Commission's
determined sanction and censured the judge.26 In doing so, the court
questioned the Commission's arithmetic in determining the number of
times that the judge had violated the CPL. For example, in one case, a
defendant was improperly held without bail, but the court disagreed with
the Commission that each time that the bail status was continued should
count as a separate act of misconduct. The Commission's "methodology
obviously inflates the numbers," 27 said the court. The court also declined
to criticize the judge for not setting bail in cases where (according to the
judge) the defendants were being held on parole violation warrants that
precluded their release. In such cases, said the court, "[d]efendants
commonly eschew bail in these circumstances to ensure that they will
receive maximum jail time credit., 28 Thus, the judge's "failure to set
bail" was "for the benefit of the defendants" and, therefore, should not
constitute misconduct, said the majority.29
The court in LaBelle reminded the Commission that it should not
get ahead of the courts in interpreting the law; the judge's decision not to
set bail in sixteen misdemeanor or violation cases where he held the
defendants for psychiatric examinations could not be regarded as
misconduct, said the court, until the law is clarified to show that bail is
required in such cases. 30
The court agreed with the Commission that Judge LaBelle engaged
in misconduct when he failed to set bail in misdemeanor cases when the
26. See In re LaBelle, 591 N.E.2d 1156, 1158 (N.Y. 1992) (per curiam).
27. Id. at 1160.
28. Id. at 1161.

29. Id. That view by the majority is misplaced. Since the law required bail to be set, is it
reasonable for the Commission, each time a judge knowingly fails to set bail that is required by law,
to determine whether it would not be in the defendant's best interests to post bail? A better standard
would seem to be that the judge should be obligated to abide by the law, set bail in minor cases, and

let the defendant decide whether to post bail where it is in the defendant's best interests not to post
bail. The court's criticism of the Commission in this regard is curious. In fact, the court rejected the

judge's explanation that in some cases he acted-in not setting bail-in the defendants' interests
because they were homeless and.needed food and shelter. See id. at 1162.
30.

Id. at 1161.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss4/19
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defendants had a poor record of returning to court or had been brought to
court on bench warrants for their failure to appear in court. 31 The court
also agreed with the Commission that a judge should not refuse to set
bail in a misdemeanor or violation case on the grounds that the
defendant's identity has not been established to the court's satisfaction.32
One of the charges against Judge LaBelle was that he wrote the
words "no bail" on warrants he issued, which was a message to the judge
who would arraign the defendant after the arrest. Recommending "no
bail" on a warrant for a defendant who, by law, is entitled to have bail
set seems to be improper. Indeed, the court held that Judge LaBelle
engaged in misconduct when he failed to set bail when defendants
appeared before him after they had been arrested on warrants. The court
stated that noting such language on warrants is a common practice and
"although it may not be advisable, it is not prohibited by any statute.
Although the court added that "[a]s long as these notations do not
preclude fair consideration of relevant bail factors when the defendant is
brought before the court, we cannot say that their use constitutes
misconduct," 34 the purpose of such notations would appear to be an
attempt by the judge who makes the "no bail" notation to interfere with
the bail-setting responsibility of the judge before whom the arrested
person will appear. Moreover, whether or not the "no bail" notations
preclude fair consideration of relevant bail factors is within the control
of the arraigning judge, not the judge who made the notations. The
implication is that the arraigning judge could be disciplined for rigidly
following the recommendation of the judge who placed the notation on
the warrant, but the judge who made the ex parte notation should not be
disciplined.
LaBelle's strong message to the Commission is that it must be
certain that what it finds to be improper has been determined to be
improper either by the clear wording of a statute or by the courts. The
point is valid, and is applicable to any claim that a judge's actions
violate the law. "What law?" has to be the first question asked; and if
there is any doubt that the judge violated or ignored the law, the
Commission cannot take action against the judge. Beyond that threshold,
it is not every improper act that should generate Commission action. The
Commission should address a judge's disregard of fundamental rights,
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.at1161-62.
Id.at 1162.
Id.
Id.
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and the action taken should depend on the effect on the party injured by
the judge's conduct. When a judge abuses his or her power and the result
is that a party surrenders a liberty interest (i.e., to be free), the
Commission should take substantial action.
In 1996, the Court of Appeals upheld the removal of a non-lawyer,
town court justice, who had been censured twice for improperly jailing
two defendants for their failure to pay restitution and fines when, in fact,
they had paid-a problem created by the judge's faulty and sloppy
record-keeping. He also sentenced defendants to jail for their failure to
pay fines without determining whether they were financially able to pay
the fines, misused the power of summary contempt, blocked defendants'
attempts to exercise the right to counsel, sentenced an individual without
a trial or guilty plea, and issued arrest warrants based on ex parte
conversations out of court.35
One year later, the court removed a judge for making an
intemperate statement about abused women, minimizing the importance
of protective orders for abused spouses, and sentencing a defendant to
jail for her failure to pay fines without ever conducting a hearing to36
determine whether the defendant was financially able to pay the fine.
The court held that "the gravity of the [judge's] judicial misdeeds
reflects a demonstrable lack of fitness for judicial office., 37 Turning first
to a single incident, the court said that the judge
committed a most serious abuse of judicial authority, when considered
within the wide range of potent powers of any judicial officer ....He
directed the arrest and summarily ordered an individual to 89 days in
jail, without affording even the most minimal, ordinary and
fundamental constitutional and procedural safeguards.38
The Court of Appeals in 1997 rejected a Commission determination
that a non-lawyer town justice should be removed, but agreed that the
judge's errors of law constituted serious misconduct. 39 The court
censured the judge for two "isolated" acts of misconduct in a forty-year
judicial career: the judge, without advising the prosecution, had set an
arraignment date for the judge's friend who had been charged with a
sexual offense, and, in the absence of the prosecution, heard evidence

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See In re Hamel, 668 N.E.2d 390, 391 (N.Y. 1996) (per curiam).
See In re Roberts, 689 N.E.2d 911 (N.Y. 1997) (per curiam).
Id.
at 912.
Id.
In re Skinner, 690 N.E.2d 484, 485-86 (N.Y. 1997).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss4/19
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and summarily dismissed the charge. The second charge concerned the
judge's handling of a bad-check, criminal case. When the eighteen-yearold defendant appeared before the judge, the judge said that the
defendant had two weeks to pay the amount on the check, and the judge
made no mention of any of the defendant's rights, notably the rights to
counsel and to a trial.4 ° When the defendant returned to court with most
of the money, the judge summarily sentenced him to jail for not having
all of the money.41
EGREGIOUS ERRORS THAT ARE NOT PART OF A PATTERN

Since the Commission has authority to render determinations of
removal, censure, and admonition, all of which are subject to review in
the Court of Appeals, the question remained whether judicial decisions
and rulings that violated fundamental rights could be subject to lesser
sanctions when such conduct did not constitute a pattern by the
respective judges. In other words, would a single abuse of authority also
justify disciplinary action?
In 1980, the Commission publicly admonished a town justice for
threatening to issue an arrest warrant against a person, who had stopped
payment on a check given to the owners of a hotel in the judge's town.
The alleged debtor, who had not been sued or charged with a crime, paid
42
the bill.
One year later, the Commission censured a town justice for
soliciting and receiving ex parte communications about pending cases in
his court, and for negligently issuing an arrest warrant for a defendant
who did not appear.43 The judge apparently forgot that he had granted an
adjournment for the defendant's appearance. 44
In 1983, the Commission publicly admonished a Supreme Court
Justice for holding a prosecutor in contempt of court because he failed to
have a witness present in court as directed by the court. The fact that
there was no indication that the prosecutor had disregarded the court's
directive, and advised the court that he had instructed the witness to be
present, did not deter the judge from following through on the contempt

40. See id. at 485.
41. See id.
42.
43.

See In re Wordon, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 145 (1981).
See In re Racicot, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 99 (1982).

44. See id.
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finding and placing the prosecutor in a cell. The defendant, charged with
murder, was greatly amused in his adjoining cell.45
The Commission publicly admonished a town justice for finding a
defendant in a speeding case guilty without a trial or a guilty plea. In
rejecting the defendant's not guilty plea, the judge expressed his
personal knowledge that drivers tend to speed on the road where the
defendant had received a speeding ticket.46
The Commission publicly admonished a family court judge for
ordering the arrest of a respondent in a support proceeding based on a
rumor the judge heard outside of court that the respondent was planning
to flee the jurisdiction, and for issuing a second warrant because he was
dissatisfied with the $500 bail set by a town justice on the respondent's
arraignment on the first warrant. 47 Three members dissented on the
grounds that issuance of the first warrant did not constitute misconduct.
When the Commission's determination was released to the public,
numerous judges expressed concern privately that the Commission was
interfering with the independence of the judiciary and urged the judge to
49
48
seek review in the Court of Appeals. The judge decided not to do SO.
The Commission has publicly disciplined judges for ignoring basic
legal provisions, notwithstanding the absence of a pattern of misconduct,
(i.e., numerous instances of violating the law).
Obviously, the less serious the violation of law is, the less obvious
the Commission's authority is. The larger the number of errors of law
that can be attributed to the judge, the more obvious it is that the
Commission has authority to act. When a single error or two leads to a
complaint of misconduct, the Commission has to be careful in
determining whether the error constitutes misconduct.50 It would seem
45.
46.
47.

See In re Sharpe, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 134 (1984).
See In re Maxon, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 143 (1986).
See In re Mullen, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 129 (1987).

48. This was reported by a judge to the Commission staff.
49. When a judge seeks review in the Court of Appeals, the court may accept or reject the
Commission's determination, and if it finds misconduct, the court may impose any discipline it
chooses under the law. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22(d); N.Y. JUD. L. § 44(9) (2002). Two judges

who sought review on Commission-imposed censures were removed by the court after review of the
record, submission of briefs, and oral argument. See In re Shilling, 415 N.E.2d 900, 903 (N.Y.
1980) (per curiam); In re Sims, 462 N.E.2d 370, 375 (N.Y. 1984) (per curiam).
50. See Judge Ciardullo's concurring opinion in In re Cox, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 90

(2003), for the views of one member of the Commission on the difficulty of drawing the line
between error and misconduct. Judge Cox is a non-lawyer judge who mishandled a complex postsentence proceeding and failed to provide due process to defendants who had not paid fines on a
timely basis. See In re Cox (N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, Dec. 30, 2002), available at

http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/C/cox.htm. That failure, including rendering summary
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appropriate for the Commission to act only if the legal principle that has
been ignored or overlooked by the judge is so fundamental that it raises
a serious question about the judge's competence. An "error" that
deprives a person of liberty may increase the chances that it would be
considered to be misconduct. If a basic constitutional right is infringed,
such as the right to counsel or to a trial, the "error," based on established
case law in New York, would warrant action by the Commission. When
a serious "error" is joined by the judge's biased or hostile remarks, the
misconduct is compounded.
UNREVIEWED COMMISSION DETERMINATIONS
The Commission has authority under its rules to issue letters of
dismissal and caution, which are confidential, pre-charge warnings, to
judges.5 1 Such letters are based on the judges' admissions of the facts,
and the judge may seek a due process hearing if he or she wishes to
challenge the letter. The Commission under its rules may also issue
letters of caution after formal due process hearings have been held.52
Each year, the Commission cautions judges for substantial mistakes of
law. When the mistake has serious consequences, instead of cautioning
the judge, the Commission may authorize charges, and if the charges are
sustained after a due process hearing, the Commission may publicly
admonish or censure the judge.53 Generally, removal from office would
be considered for a pattern of such abuses.
At times, town or village justices have precluded litigants from
initiating legal action on the mistaken belief that the justices can screen
cases they choose to handle. The Commission investigates such matters
and takes either public or nonpublic action when the complaints are
confirmed.54 The failure to provide hearings in civil and criminal cases,

jail terms without ascertaining the defendants' financial ability to pay the previously-imposed fines
and without notifying the defendants' counsel, led to discipline. Three months later, the same
Commission member questioned, in another concurring opinion, the discipline of a non-lawyer
judge who had awarded more than the amount originally claimed, double court costs, and
unsubstantiated attorneys' fees in a small claims proceeding. See In re McCall (N.Y. Comm'n on
Judicial Conduct Mar. 28, 2003) (Ciardullo, J., concurring) (noting that such conduct constitutes
mistakes of law and not misconduct, but concurring in the disciplinary sanction because the judge's
other decisions, as charged, "deprived the defendant of his fundamental and basic due process
rights"), availableat http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/DeterminationsM/mccall.htm.
51. N.Y. COMP. R. & REG. tit. 22, § 7000.1(l).
52. Id. at § 7000.1(m).
53. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22(a) (2001).
54. See, e.g., In re Loper, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 172 (1985).
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when the law requires hearings, has been the basis for discipline in
numerous cases before the Commission.
Threatening criminal process against civil defendants, 55 entering a
judgment of conviction against a defendant without a trial or a guilty
plea and in the absence of a criminal charge, 56 and failing to advise
defendants of their right to assigned counsel if they are unable to afford
counsel 57 were the basis of public discipline of several judges.
The Commission publicly rebuked other judges who waived their
right to review in the Court of Appeals. Among the "errors" were
revoking the Release on Recognizance status of the defendant, setting
bail and jailing the defendant because he had asked the court for an
adjournment; 58 issuing a warrant of eviction on an ex parte request of a
landlord without any notice to the tenant and without conducting a court
proceeding; 59 entering judgment in a small claims case without a trial,
based on the defendant-son's "moral obligation" to pay his mother for
expenses she had incurred when he was a child; 60 revoking bail and
jailing a defendant because the defendant's lawyer failed to appear in
court due to a scheduling conflict; 61 ordering a defendant handcuffed for
nearly two hours because the defendant's pager sounded in court as
other business was going on; 62 threatening a small claims court
defendant with arrest if he failed to pay a civil settlement
notwithstanding the judge knew he could not have the defendant
arrested; 63 and abusing the contempt power by sentencing a defendant in
a civil case to jail, where the defendant remained for forty-five days,
64
without a hearing for conduct that was not in the presence of the judge.
The justification for the Commission's actions in these cases is that,
while an appellate court may change an incorrect decision, the appellate
court has no authority to discipline the judge. Moreover, appellate courts
do not consider all errors. The errors depicted in these cases are
fundamental and should have been avoided, suggesting incompetence,
bias, a reckless disregard of the law, or a lack of understanding of the
55.
56.
57.
58.

See In re Mayville, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 180 (1985).
See In re Curcio, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 80 (1984).
See Inre Shannon, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 161 (2002).
See In re Hopkins, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 93 (1987).

59.

See In re Holmes, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 139 (1998).

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See In re Degenhardt, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 91 (1999).
See ln re Slavin, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 158 (1990).
See In re Feinman, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 105 (2000).
See In re Hamm, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 123 (2003).
See In re Teresi, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 163 (2002).
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proper role of a judge. If no disciplinary action were taken in these
matters, it is quite possible that the judges would have continued to act
in disregard of law and might have developed, by their actions, a record
of a pattern of abuse that could some day have resulted in their removal
from office.
STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN RESPECTING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AND DISCIPLINING ABUSE OF JUDICIAL POWER

Section 100.3(B)(1) of the rules governing judicial conduct
provides that judges "shall be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence in it."' 65 Obviously, a judge whose decision is
reversed by an appellate court for an error of law has not necessarily
violated that section of the rules. Simply put, a judge is not unfaithful to
the law and does not reveal a failure to maintain professional
competence in the law by making mistakes. The language of the
applicable rule suggests that to protect the independence of the judiciary,
the Commission must meet a high burden before it disciplines a judge
for a ruling or decision that is contrary to law.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals, beginning in the early
1980s, clearly support the Commission's view that egregious errors of
law that deprive defendants of due process warrant discipline. The court
has removed judges who have either totally disregarded their
responsibilities to safeguard the rights of litigants or who lack an
understanding of the judicial role. 66 The removal cases concerned
patterns of misconduct. Single-incident cases-those in which judges
have not been faithful to the law-usually result in a disciplinary
sanction less severe than removal from office. Since judges who have
65. N.Y. COMP. R. & REG. tit. 22, § 100.3(B)(1).
66. A judge's lack of recognition that undisputed acts constituted misconduct recently led the
Court of Appeals to believe that the judge may repeat the misconduct. In re Bauer, No. 125, 2004
N.Y. LEXIS 2411, at *1 (N.Y., Oct.14, 2004). Although the Court was divided as to whether the
setting of extraordinarily high bail in numerous cases constituted misconduct, all seven judges of the
court agreed that failure to advise defendants of the right to counsel and of assigned counsel for
those who are unable to afford representation is serious misconduct. The four judges who voted to
remove Judge Bauer refused to separate the denial of counsel from the setting of bail in amounts of
between $10,000 and $50,000 for violations that carried either minimal incarceration upon
conviction or none atall. After the unrepresented defendants served a few days in jail on exorbitant
bail they could not meet, they accepted the judge's offer to sentence them to "time served" if they
pleaded guilty. The majority held that the imposition of punitive bail, when combined with the
failure to advise the defendants of their right to assigned counsel, "all but guaranteed that the
defendants would be coerced into pleading guilty: it was the only way to get out of jail." In re
Bauer, 2004 N.Y. LEXIS 2411, at *8.
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been publicly admonished or censured by the Commission were
generally content to accept the Commission's determination, the Court
of Appeals usually does not review single-incident cases.67 It is hard to
imagine that the court would not have upheld the Commission's
decisions to admonish or censure judges for the single-incident abuses
that prompted the Commission to impose discipline. Revoking a
defendant's bail for the failure of the defendant's lawyer to appear in
court,68 jailing a lawyer for the failure of a witness to appear on time,6 9
and handcuffing a defendant for nearly two hours because his pager rang
in court 7° are inexcusable abuses of power and should not be ignored.
For many decades, the courts excused egregious errors by asserting
the principle that the judges' acts were made in "good faith." If good
faith were a defense to a charge of misconduct, the Commission would
be hamstrung in bringing charges against judges who should be
disciplined no matter what the reasons were for their conduct. Proving
bad faith would be an insurmountable burden, especially when the judge
does not express animosity for the person whose rights are being
disregarded. Furthermore, incompetence should not be protected. Goodfaith mistakes can have terrible consequences, and regardless of the
motives of a judge who acts contrary to law, there are times when
disciplinary action must be taken. Good faith, of course, could be a
mitigating factor as to an appropriate sanction.7'
Disciplining judges for errors of law is controversial, especially
when it is not limited to egregious due process violations of established
law. And not all Commission members have been in agreement, over the
past three decades, that judges should be disciplined for flagrant errors
of law. For a lengthy period, for example, the Commission would not act

67. Under the law, only a judge who is the subject of a Commission determination for
removal, censure, or admonition may request review of the Commission's determination by the
New York State Court of Appeals. N.Y. JUD. L. § 44(7), (9) (2002). So, if a judge does not seek
review, the Commission's determination takes effect. When a judge seeks review of a Commission
determination, the Court of Appeals, after hearing the matter on the record before the Commission,
may take any disciplinary action provided by law. See In re Shilling, 415 N.E.2d 900, 903 (N.Y.
1980) (judge facing censure sought review and was removed from office by the Court of Appeals).
68. See In re Slavin, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 158 (1990).
69. See In re Sharpe, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 134 (1984).
70. See In re Feinman, N.Y. COMM'N ANN. REP. 105 (2000).
71. In In re Skinner, the Court of Appeals, in censuring the judge for misconduct in two cases,
listed mitigating factors that warranted the judge's retention as a judge, including that "there is no
indication that petitioner was motivated by personal profit, vindictiveness or ill will." In re Skinner,
690 N.E.2d 484, 486 (N.Y. 1997) (per curiam). The judge had served as a Town Court Justice for
nearly forty years.
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against a judge who abused the contempt power. It took some time to
forge the principle that, while most judicial "errors" do not constitute
judicial misconduct, judicial error and judicial misconduct are not
mutually exclusive.7 2
Arguably, the most important contribution made by the
Commission over the past three decades was to bring disciplinary cases
against judges who abused the power of their offices by violating the
rights of litigants or others in court. That is particularly so in light of the
court decisions in the early part of the twentieth century that made it
difficult to impose discipline for serious judicial errors. The New York
Court of Appeals was the key factor in the progress made over the past
two decades. In the exercise of its authority to review Commission
determinations on request of the judges who faced public discipline, the
court consistently refused to tolerate the abuse of judicial power.

72. The Commission's confidential cautions play an important role in educating judges. Since
about sixty percent of the State's judiciary are non-lawyers, the Commission can instruct nonlawyer town and village justices before their isolated errors become a pattern of errors.
Consequently, the Commission privately cautions judges for errors that are neither egregious nor
have profound consequences. Perhaps surprisingly, lawyer-judges also have to be instructed about
their blatant errors of law. The judges who abused their power in holding a lawyer responsible for
the lateness of a witness, a defendant responsible for the absence of his lawyer, and a defendant in
handcuffs for his failure to turn off his pager were all full-time lawyer judges. See supra notes 6870.
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